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CHINA AND VIETNAM IN THE SOUTH 




Being one of the most dynamic regions in the International System 
(IS),  both in the economic and political point of view, Asia ends up attracting 
global attention and also questions, that were local until then, become the 
focus of international interests. Among these are the territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea (SCS), which involve the Southeast Asia countries and 
one of the most important powers in the contemporary international system: 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Regarding the parts involved in the territorial disputes in the SCS, 
Vietnam and China are the only ones to claim sovereignty of the totality of the 
Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, engendring an overlap of demands. While 
China occupies the entire group of Paracel’s islands and fifteen formations 
of the Spratlys archipelago, Vietnam occupies some of these islands, consid-
ering them as a maritime district of the Province of Khanh Hoe (U.S Energy 
Information Administration 2013, 7). There is another common point in their 
demands: both countries legitimize its claims based on historical rights of the 
use and ocupation of theses territories in dispute. This similarity, allied with 
the particularities of the sino-vietnamese relation, makes the evolution of this 
bilateral dispute sheds some light on the understanding of the political and 
strategic elements involved in this debate.  
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The South China Sea
The SCS is a semi-open sea and surrounded by China, Vietnam, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand, Philippines and Taiwan. The 
SCS has a total dimension of approximately 3.600 square kilometeres and 
it connects to other seas through the Taiwan Strait, the Lombok Strait and 
the Malacca Strait, making a strategic connection between the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans. Between the main groups of islands, stands out the Paracel, 
in its Northwest portion, and Spratly, in the centre of the Sea, both being the 
focus of the most part of the territorial disputes (Beckman 2012, 3). Figure 1 
below brings the representation of the Sea in question, identifying its main 
elements.
Figure 1 – The South China Sea2
Source: The South China Sea, website.
2 Available on: <http://www.southchinasea.org/category/mpas/page/2> Accessed March 02, 
2014.
 2 
Source: The South China Sea, web site. 
 
 
The Sea on debate raises regional and global interests due to some aspects. In 
the first place, there is significant speculation about the exploration potential of 
natural resources, in particular hydrocarbons, in the region. Notwithstanding, there’s 
still no consesus on the dimension, or even on the existence, of such resources, the 
projections are uncertain and divergent. The U.S Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), for example, estimates that there are reserves of about 11 billion of oil barrels 
and about 190 trillion of cubic meters of gas in the region (U.S Energy Information 
Administration 2013, 2). For its turn, the Chinese National Offshore Oil  Company 
(CNOOC), suggested, in 2012, the existence of reserves of about 125 billion of oil 
barrels and 500 trillion of cubic meters of natural gas in SCS (U.S Energy 
Information Administration 2013, 2). Spratly and Paracel archipelagos would be less 
attractive: the first one would have little or no oil reserves, but it could hold 
significant gas depositories duo to its geological carachteristics. The second one, in 
turn, would not show relevant reserves, and presented discouraging geological studies 
results (U.S Energy Information Administration, 4). 
In second place, the Sea on debate is one of the maritime routes with more 
circulation in the world: it’s estimated that more than a half of the oil and mercantile 
fleet of the world go through the SCS every year. This occurs due to its geographic 
position: the area is not only the shorter route starting from the Middle East and 
Africa, important oil and natural resources suppliers, towards Asia, but also it gives 
access to Southest Asia, that gathers the main manufactured goods exporters of the 
world economy (Rosenberg 2011, 7-8). 
The SCS attracts, thus, the interests of different countries, not only Asian 
ones, but also from others parts of the world, motivated by the strategic importance of 
the region. It’s worth to notice that the contraposition of regional and international 
interestes is reflected in the aplication and elaboration of agreements and treaties 
about the use of the area. Among them, two examples about the Law of the Sea stand 
out, an international and a regional one: the UNCLOS3 (United Nations Convention 
                                                        
3 The UNCLOS was signed in Montego Bay in 1982 and represented a great advence about the 
organizations and the definition of the rules, laws and concepts relative to the use and Exploration of  
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The Sea on debate raises regional and global interests due to some 
aspects. In the first place, there is significant speculation about the explora-
tion potential of natural resources, in particular hydrocarbons, in the region. 
Notwithstanding, there’s still no consesus on the dimension, or even on the 
existence, of such resources, the projections are uncertain and divergent. The 
U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA), for example, estimates that 
there are reserves of about 11 billion of oil barrels and about 190 trillion of 
cubic meters of gas in the region (U.S Energy Information Administration 
2013, 2). For its turn, the Chinese National Offshore Oil  Company (CNOOC), 
suggested, in 2012, the existence of reserves of about 125 billion of oil barrels 
and 500 trillion of cubic meters of natural gas in SCS (U.S Energy Informa-
tion Administration 2013, 2). Spratly and Paracel archipelagos would be less 
attractive: the first one would have little or no oil reserves, but it could hold 
significant gas depositories duo to its geological carachteristics. The second 
one, in turn, would not show relevant reserves, and presented discouraging 
geological studies results (U.S Energy Information Administration, 4).
In second place, the Sea on debate is one of the maritime routes with 
more circulation in the world: it’s estimated that more than a half of the oil 
and mercantile fleet of the world go through the SCS every year. This occurs 
due to its geographic position: the area is not only the shorter route starting 
from the Middle East and Africa, important oil and natural resources suppli-
ers, towards Asia, but also it gives access to Southest Asia, that gathers the 
main manufactured goods exporters of the world economy (Rosenberg 2011, 
7-8).
The SCS attracts, thus, the interests of different countries, not only 
Asian ones, but also from others parts of the world, motivated by the strate-
gic importance of the region. It’s worth to notice that the contraposition of 
regional and international interestes is reflected in the aplication and elabora-
tion of agreements and treaties about the use of the area. Among them, two 
examples about the Law of the Sea stand out, an international and a regional 
one: the UNCLOS3 (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the 
Declaration on the Conduct Parties in the South China Sea (COC), elaborated 
together by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
The UNCLOS defines zones that delimit and clarify the extension of 
the sovereignty of coastal states over its seas and adjacents oceans, allowing 
the regulation of the economic exploration of the costal states. They are three, 
3  The UNCLOS was signed in Montego Bay in 1982 and represented a great advence about the 
organizations and the definition of the rules, laws and concepts relative to the use and Explora-
tion of  the seas and oceans. It came into force in 1994 and today it counts with 166 signatories, 
among them: China and Vietnam (Accioly, Castella, Silva 2009, 564).
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the zones estabilished by the UNCLOS from a common point, the baseline. 
They are determined by the line, along the cost, where the sea level is the 
lower before the mainland. The first zone from the baseline is the Territo-
rial Waters, which extend up to 12 nautical miles (about 22 km) and above 
where the Costal State exercises full sovereignty over the sea, land and sub-
soil, besides having duites of police and of sailing regulation, allowing only 
the harmless passage of comercial ships and/or warships (Accioly, Casella, 
Silva 2009, 568).
In the case of the countries whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to 
others States, the extension of the Territorial Sea besides the medium point 
between the baselines of both is prohibited. This decision is not aplicable only 
when there is a specific historical determinat (e.g: the historic use of the area) 
or other special circumstance. This point is extremely important in the SCS 
case: the sea not only fits in the opposite or adjacent classification, but also, 
in the perspective of the demanding countries, it brings historical elementes 
that justify adaptations.
The second zone estabilished by the UNCLOS is the Contiguous Zone 
which can reach up to 24 nautical miles (including the 12 miles of the Terri-
torial Sea). In this area, the country can exercise all the necessary preventive 
mesures to ensure its security, before ships, comercial or warships, reach the 
Territorial Sea, as customs and phytosanitary control (Accioly, Casella, Silva 
2009, 574). The third delimitation is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), an 
adjacent area of the Territorial Sea, that includes the Contiguous Zone, reach-
ing up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) from the baseline. Each country 
has its own EEZ sovereign rights with regard to exploration, preservation and 
administration of the natural resources, whether living or non-living, existing 
in the water, ground and underground of the EEZ (Organização das Nações 
Unidas 1982, 45).
Besides the zones, two concepts defined by the UNCLOS deserve to 
be pointed: Continental Shelf and islands. The Continetal Shelf is a natural 
extension of the continent that extends to some point of the sea or, when 
not geographically determined, to 200 nautical miles, following the EEZ ref-
erences. The Shelf refers to the ground and underground that allowed the 
economic exploration of these areas. Upon the continental shelf the Costal 
State has the sovereign right of exploration and apropriation of the existing 
resources.
The concept of “island” refers to “(...) a natural land formation, sur-
rounded by water, that stays uncoverd in the beach-sea” (Organização das 
Nações Unidas 1982). Islands capable of bearing human habitation also have 
right to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the EEZ and the Continen-
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tal Shelf (Organização das Nações Unidas 1982). Such definition of island 
becomes central on the debate about SCS: of 150 rocky formations that com-
pound the Spratly range, only 40 come near of the island classification esta-
bilished by the UNCLOS. Thereby, the most part of the rocks, islets and reefs 
that form the Spratlys does not have the EEZ and the Continental Shelf: the 
sovereignty on this island, so, does not ensure, necessarily, the possession of 
its natural resources (Beckman 2012, 3).
Finally, the UNCLOS also created the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS), whose goal is to facilitate the implementation 
of the convention with regard to the delimitation of the signatories States’s 
Continental Shelf. Its function is to analyze the datas submitted by the coastal 
states, allowing the identification of the Continental Shelf dimensions (Or-
ganização das Nações Unidas 1982). It is worth mentioning that the CLCS 
only analyzes the presented information, not having, so, the power to decide 
controversies between two or more States.
The UNCLOS is the main reference about Law of Sea, getting to in-
fluence even the non-signatory States. On the SCS issue, great part of the ter-
ritorial claims made by the countries involved in the dispute use as reference 
the elements estabilished by the UNCLOS and its consequential sovereignty 
rights: therewith, the pleas guarantee more international legitimacy. Vietnam 
and China, for example, incorporate the UNCLOS classification in its pleas, 
but also use other arguments, as the historical right, to legitimate its demands 
(U.S Energy Information Administration 2013, 10).
The second example highlighted concerns a regional effort of reg-
ulation:the COC, elaborated by ASEAN and China. The COC’s negotiation 
process began, in reality, in order to elaborate a binding legal document: the 
Code of Conduct in the SCS. The inciative was lauched in 1999, after a series 
of incidents involving countries of the region, members and no-members of 
ASEAN. Identifying the potential for regional destabilization, the Association 
proposed the formulation of a document capable of regulating the activities 
in the SCS, avoiding conflicts and the escalation of tensions (Thao 2003, 279-
280).
The negociations were marked by disagreements on the content of 
the document and reflected the disputes and the national pleas regarding sov-
ereignty rights. Among the main difficulties were: (a) to determine the scope 
of the enforcement of the Code, if for the entire SCS or only for the areas in 
dispute; (b) to restrict or not the use of occupied places and in dispute; (c) 
to allow military activities next to the Spratly aggregation, and (d) to liberate 
fishing in the areas in dispute (Thayer 2013, 76-77). The lack of progress in 
the negociations and the need of a consensus that would legitimate the doc-
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ument, lead China and ASEAN members to sign, in 2002, the COC, a not 
binding political document which expressed the commitment of both parts 
on keeping a positive effort to ensure regional stability (Thayer 2013, 77).
The document stressed yet the principles agreed in the UNCLOS, in 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 4and in the Five Prin-
ciples of Peaceful Coexistence5 that guide ASEAN (Thayer 2013, 280). It is 
interesting to note the blend between elements consecrated on the regionl 
dinamics, as the mutual trust and the pacifism, and international regulatories 
elements, as is the UNCLOS case, which serve as a pilar for most part of the 
territorial demands of the ASEAN countries acting, thus, as its legitimating 
base.
Even if the COC didn’t match the initial goal of a binding Code, it 
was seen as a progress for the maintenance of regional peace and security, 
providing the references for futures discussions regarding the rights of explo-
ration and sovereignty over the SCS. Moreover, the main points that should 
compose a Code of Conduct were contained in the Declaration: (a) no use of 
force; (b) self-restraint; (c) pacific resolution of conflicts; (d) strengthening of 
the mutual trust; (e) cooperation and (f) respect for the freedom of navigation 
(Thao 2003, 281). Even so, the text gaps, as the inaccuracy about the scope of 
the Declaration and the ambiguity, made it urgent, in the ASEAN vision, the 
elaboration of the Code (Thayer 2013, 79).
However, some obstacles hamper negotiations, such as the extension 
of the Chinese participation on the formulation of an ASEAN document, 
the period needed for the maturation period of proposals, the possibility of 
foreign interference and the need of consensus (Thayer 2013, 81-82). Thus, 
negotiations remain open and evolve taking slow steps, despite external pres-
sure especially from the United States (USA) and Japan, and internal, as from 
Vietnam. The negotiating process of the COC as well as the Code, reflect the 
typical regional reality: for the Southeast Asia countries it’s clear the ideia 
that the relations between China and ASEAN are the basis for Asian stability, 
then, coexistence, pacific whenever possible, respecting the role of each actor 
involved is central for the understanding of the Asian perpective about the 
4  The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was signed in 1976 and had as goal 
to reinforce the historical tie that got the countries of the region united. The signatories would 
be committed to cooperate in different areas, as policy, economy and social, so to ensure the 
stability necessary to the progress of the Southest Asia region (Associação das Nações do Sud-
este Asiático 1976).
5  The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: (a) mutual respect for sovereignty and re-
gional integrity; (b) non-aggression; (c) equality and mutual benefit, (d) non-interference on 
domestic questions, and (e) peaceful coexistence.
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question.
The demands of China and Vietnam: origins and legitimacy
Chinese demands use as their main argument the idea that the PRC 
has an historical right6 over the SCS. For this purpose, China refers to official 
documents of several dynasties that already mentioned the SCS relevance for 
the country. Records from Western Han dinasty (206 BC – 9 AC), for exam-
ple, point that the routes that connected the Southeast Asia countries, and 
passed through the Strait of Malacca, were already used and served as facilita-
tors for regional trade. Historical records of the Yuan dinasty (1271 BC – 1388 
AC) show a high degree of development and of patrol capacity of the Chinese 
navy, concentrated on the maritime routes (Shen 2002, 120-123).
The cartographic technicals precariousness of this period hindered 
the standardization of the localizations and the names of islands, corals and 
reefs existing on SCS. Although a more recent map, elaborated in 1402 dur-
ing the Ming dinasty (1368-1644), identify three locations that, according to 
the geographic coordinates, would correspond to the Spratly and Paracel is-
lands: since that period, Chinese oficials maps put such places as being part 
of the Chinese territory, even if the names were different from the current 
ones (Shen 2002, 126-128). The Qianli Changsha (actual Xisha or Parcel) and 
Wanli Shitang (actual Nansha or Spratly) islands, therefore, were already un-
der the jurisdiction of the City hall of Qiong, that currently correspond to the 
Province of Hainan (Shen 2002, 132). From this perspective, China would be 
the first State to map, study and make use of the SCS. Such condition would 
not have been internationally expressed and officialized long before only due 
to the inexistence of contestation of the Chinese presence and sovereignty in 
the region (Shen 2002, 140).
The first formalisation of the Chinese claims happenned yet in 1887 
with the Convention regarding the Delimitation of the Border between China 
and Tonkin, which determined the jurisdiction of each portion of the SCS 
(Furtado 1999, 388-389). At that time, European and Japanese expansionism 
to Southeast Asia made Chinese predominance over the SCS uncertain and 
open to challenge. In 1933, French troops invaded and occupied nine islands 
of the Spratlys archipelago, and, in 1939, during the Second Word War, Japa-
6  Such premise is based on intertemporal right, whose use is extensive in China. From this 
perspective, the questions are judged based on the analysis of the historical process and in its 
comparison with the contemporary laws: thereby, the laws in force in the moment of emer-
gence of the disputes would have prevalence over the current ones (Jacques 2009, 294).
Talita Pinotti
165
nese troops invaded some of the main islands of the SCS (Shen 2002, 136).
With the end of Second World War, the sovereignty question over the 
SCS islands got worse: with the eviction of the territories by Japan and Euro-
pean powers, there were room for countries, till then occupied, to also present 
its claims over the SCS. At the time, the Chinese government was worried 
about the agreements that allowed the resumption of the territories occupied 
by foreign powers: the Declaration of Cairo and the Proclamation of Potsdam 
determined that the occupied territories during the war should be returned to 
its original owners, including the occupied territories in the SCS (Shen 2002, 
137).
Thereby, in 1951, in the period of elaboration of the Treaty of San 
Francisco, Zhou Enlai, then PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that 
the Chinese Sovereignty over Spratlys and Paracels was inviolable and that, 
although the territories had been occupied by Japan during the Second War, 
China succeeded in recovering them, reaffirming its sovereignty (Furtado 
1999, 389-390). Between the years 1960 and 1970, however, due to internal 
questions, the debate regarding the sovereignty over the SCS stayed on the 
background (Jian 2013, 20).
From the Vietnamese side, its sovereignty over the Spratly and Para-
cel islands also has historical foundation. In the White Paper about the Hoang 
Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) islands published by the Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam in 1975 an historic is presented that would be able to prove its 
sovereignty over the archipelagos in debate. By the given description, maps 
elaborated between the years 1630 and 1653 would already bring indications 
of the existence of such islands, that would be part of the Vietnamese ter-
ritory: such documents brought references to the characteristics of the is-
lands known currently as Paracel (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 5-6). 
The formalization of the Vietnamese possessions over the Paracel territories 
would have occurred in 1816 and, since then, the government of Vietnam 
was responsible for several administrative activities and for the patrol of the 
islands and adjacent waters (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 14-16). In 
the Spratlys case, the Vietnam government would not have implemented a 
systematic policy of administration and jurisdiction, but a map published in 
1838 by local explorers would make reference to the Spratlys, under the name 
Van Ly Truong Sa, as part of the Vietnamese territory (República Socialista do 
Vietnã 1975, 28).
It is worth noting that the period of French occupation, contrary to 
what could have been imagined, had not broken Vietnamese sovereignty over 
the archipelagos: in Vietnam speech, France only gave continuity to the ad-
ministration held until then by the Nguyen dinasty. In the Spratly case, the 
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french invasion in 1933, reported by China as an agression to Chinese territo-
ry, would be, in the Vietnamese view, the legal possession of the islands under 
the administration of the French protectorate (República Socialista do Vietnã 
1975, 26). In relation to Paracel, the French government would have given 
continuity to the administrative activities “on behalf of Vietnam”, having its 
domain over the archipelago interrupted briefly from 1941 onwards, due to 
the Japanese invasion. The end of Second World War, however, forced Japan 
to return the territories to its original owners.
It should be noted that in the Vietnamese White Paper the mention 
to the Declaration of Cairo and to the Proclamation of Potsdam presented a 
Chinese dinasty’s interpretation. In the Vietnamese view, since the right of 
possession of Vietnam was not denied, it allows the transference of sover-
eignty from France to Vietnam to be seen as a legacy from the colonial period 
(República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 32).
In 1951, during the 7ª Plenary Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, Tran Van Huu, then Vietnam’s Prime Minister, made a pronounce-
ment reaffirming Vietnamese sovereignty over such islands (Furtado 1999, 
391). Such declaration had the function to assure an already existing right and, 
so, would have an effect even over countries not represented in the Confer-
ence7, what would annul any contestation to the fact (República Socialista do 
Vietnã 1975, 37). In the period after, marked by the Civil War between North 
Vietnam and South Vietnam, the territorial claims stayed on the background.
In 1974, in a supposed response to the constant violations of the Chi-
nese territory of Paracel and of the attack to fishermen and to Chinese mil-
itary ships from the part of Vietnamese vessels, Chinese soldiers occupied 
the main islands of the archipelago retaking the territory from the foreign 
domain (Shen 2002, 147). In Vietnam, the event was described as a brutal 
invasion to the archipelago by the Chinese troops: unprepared for the conflict 
and undermined by the Civil War, Vietnamese troops would have had little 
responsiveness, losing the totality of Paracel for China (República Socialista 
do Vietnã 1975, 42).
In the 1980s, the emphasis given by Vietnam on the economic re-
form, Doi Mou, redefined the priority assigned to territorial demands: the 
need of a stable regional environment which allowed to focus on economic 
development was essential, by making Vietnamese external politics seek to 
improve its relations with its neighbors (Hai 2013, 27). On the Chinese side, 
the 1980s were marked by the concern with the reassurance of its presence 
7  At the time, the government that represented China in the United Nations was the Republic 
of China and not PRC, with whom the disputes about the islands in question are more intense. 
The PRC only would take the seat designated to China in 1971.
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on the SCS (Jian 2013, 20).
In 1988, a new tension happened between Chinese and Vietnamese 
troops, this time in the Spratlys region (Crisis Group 2012 a, 3). According to 
the Chinese report, the clash occurred because, in one of its patrol exercises 
in the Spratlys region, Chinese navy ships would have been attacked by Vi-
etnamese ships, being forced to hit back in defense. As a result, the Chinese 
government would have felt the need to reinforce its presence in the occup-
pied islands of the archipelago (Shen 2002, 149). Since then, China controls 
part of the Spratlys islands.
Since the 1990s both governments will be concerned about the ad-
equacy of their claims to the international norm. In 1992, for exemple, the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) approved the Law about the People's Re-
public of China’s Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which defines the 
Chinese sovereignty on the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, in addition to 
reserve to China the right of the use of force in case of disrespect of its sover-
eign rights (Thao 2000, 105).
The ratification of UNCLOS by both countries, not coincidentally, 
took place in this period: Hanoi ratified the Convention in 1994, while Beijing 
did it in 1996. It was also in the 1990s that the ideia of peaceful resolution of 
the disputes gains prominence within ASEAN: in 1994, during the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, China committed itself to solve the disputes 
with Vietnam in relation to the Spratlys through peaceful negotiations (Thao 
2000, 108). In 1995, Vietnam became an official member of ASEAN, and was 
able to make use of the Association as a broker in the negotiations with China 
(Kaplan 2014, 53). Years later, in 1999, the Vietnamese and Chinese Genal 
Secretaries of the Comunist Parties, Kha Phieu and Jiang Zemin respectively, 
published a joint statement that valued the reinforcement of the mutual trust 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Thao 2000, 111-112). In the same 
year, the proposal to create a Code of Conduct between the ASEAN members 
and China is officially released (Thao 2000, 114).
In the begining of the 2000, the efforts to cooperate resulted in one 
of the only iniciatives well succeded of the joint administration of the SCS re-
sources that involved, precisely, China and Vietnam. The agreements in ques-
tion make reference to the Gulf of Tonkin, or Beibu, that borders both coun-
tries and is the meeting point of its related EEZs. The agreements, signed in 
2000, entered into force in 2004 and shall be effective for fifteen years. The 
documents define rules for fishing, for the access to the EEZ of the counter-
part and for the joint administration of the goods of the Gulf (Rosenberg 2011, 
120). Although restrict to only one area of the SCS, the document is seen as 
an exemple of the provision of the parts to cooperate, prioritizing the joint 
China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: disputes and strategic questions
168 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.4, n.8, Jul./Dec. 2015 
developmnet of resources (Kaplan 2014, 42). Two years later, in 2002, the sig-
nature of COC between China and ASEAN represented an important advance 
in the negotiations about the topic, favouring mutual trust (Thao 2003, 281).
Nevertheless, in 2009, Vietnam surpriesed the Chinese government 
by submitting to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) two requests of extension of its Continental Shelf to beyond the 200 
nautical miles. One of them, together with Malasya, made reference to the 
south portion of the SCS; the other one, individual, proposed to advance the 
Vietnamese Continental Shelf, closer to the Spratly archipelago, reaching the 
limit of 350 nautical miles (Crisis Group 2012a, 3). In the document, Viet-
nam defended the legitimacy of its plea according to the UNCLOS provisions 
about the Continental Shelf  and asserted that the area under discussion had 
not been claimed by previous presented demands until then. So, the Viet-
namese government plea involved sovereingty, the sovereign rights and the 
national jurisdiction over the seas and the continental shelf of the Spratlys 
and Paracels (Malásia, República Socialista do Vietnã 2009, 2).
In response, China sent a verbal note to CLCS contesting both of the 
submissions, the joint as well as the Vietnamese with the following text:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
over relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached 
map). (República Popular da China 2009, 1)
The text went on stating that the joint submission violates the sover-
eign rights and the Chinese jurisdiction in the region on debate and, there-
fore, requested to CLCS that disregard the request. The SCS map8 attached 
(Figure 2) showed nine lines in the shape of "U" that, together, formed a belt 
drawn from the Chinese territory which inclueded the Paracel and Spratlys ar-
chipelagos (República Popular da China 2009, 1-2). This was the first official 
mention to the pointed map in a context of debate about the SCS. However, 
the figuere by itself doesn’t clarify the Chinese position regarding the delimit-
ed area: even the verbal note didn’t offer subsidies that allowed the identifica-
tion of the Chinese demands.  
The verbal note, added to the nine lines map, points four elements, 
8  This map was drafted in 1946 by the Republic of China (RC) government as an attempt map 
the region defined as the RC´s "historic waters". Since 1949, the new communist government 
of the PRC made use of this map only altering the number of lines: from eleven to nine, but 
maintaining de dellimited area. The nine lines map, as it became to be known, includes the 
whole of the SCS, without limiting itself to the special economic zones. (Rosenberg 2011, 11)
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without offering further information: (a) the Chinese sovereignty extends to 
the SCS islands and to the adjacente waters, without defining such concept; 
(b) the sovereignty includes the maritime bottom and subsoil; (c) the rights 
there presented have historical foundation, and (d) the nine lines map serve 
as reference to the Chinese claim, even if  not defining its content (Nien-Tsu 
2010, 204-205).
Such inaccuracies unleashed new speculations about the Chinese 
claims (Nien-Tsu 2010, 204). Among some of the raised interpretations were 
the most radicals views, such as the Vietnamese, that understood that the nine 
lines map preached Chinese sovereignty over the entire area inside the lines, 
as well as more moderate views, as the Singapore one, which highlighted 
the inconsistency with the international laws made absurd the ideia that the 
entire area inside the nine lines was pleaded by China (Crisis Group 2012a, 
3). On the Chinese side there was no effort to clarify: however, statements in 
international forums seemed to indicate that the country didin’t claim for 
sovereign rights over the entire area delimited by the line, but over the island 
that it surrounds. In 2012, for exemple, the spokesman of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Hong Lei, differentiates disputes regarding the sovereignty over 
the SCS reefs and islands from disputes with regard to maritime delimitation 
(Crisis Group 2012b, 3). 
Since then, the region became more sensitive with regard to topics 
about territorial disputes in SCS. In 2010, as president of the ARF meeting, 
Vietnam included the SCS on the agenda’s event, warning to the urgency of a 
legal administration mechanism of the disputes. Therefore, several countries 
present, not only the Asian ones, treated the topic in its official speeches: 
until then the subject was debated exclusively in Asian forums (Crisis Group 
2012a, 7).  
The subject reappeared in the next year, in 2011, during the East Asia 
Summit (EAS). In the occasion, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao defended 
the inadequacy of the forum for the discussion of the topic. Even so, he reaf-
firmed China´s posture of collaboration with ASEAN neighbors, which set, 
through the COC, the negotiation of a Code of Conduct. The premier rein-
forced the importance of mutual trust and cooperation to ensure the regional 
stability (“Premier...” 2011, 1). Wen made clear with such declaration that the 
attempt to press the country through the involvement of other parts in the 
negotiation, would not lead to a solution of disputes.
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Figure 2 – The Nine Lines attached presented by China in 2009
Source: People’s Republic of China, 2009
 In the same year, Chinese maritime patrol ships aproached the viet-
namese  seismic survey ship, Binh Minh 02, during an operation supposedly 
inside the vietnamese EEZ and cut one of its cables of seismic monitoring. 
The episode had great repercussion in Vietnam, with public protests anti-Chi-
na organized by the national elite in the main cities of the country. The domes-
tic pressure stimulated a more assertive answer from the Vietnamese Prime 
Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, whose declaration reaffirmed the determination 
of the Party, the population and the army of protection of the Vietnam’s rights 
on the region (Thayer 2011, 86-88).
In the following weeks several military exercises were carried out in 
Vietnamese waters, fostering the wave of nationalist demonstrations, which 
lasted around twelve weeks, mobilizing a great part of the Vietnamese society 
(Thayer 2011, 89). To avoid the escalation of tensions, Vietnam and China 
leaders met and published through a joint announcement that ensure the 
mutual disposition in solving the question by peaceful negotiations, aimed 
at peacekeeping and regional stability. The announcement also mentioned 
public demonstrations about the topic and the need that they were guided 
by governments: the Comunist Parties should avoid that popular demonstra-
tions prejudice the bilateral relation (Thayer 2011, 90).
Therefore, Beijing decided that it needed to review its posture with 
 10 
 
The subject reappeared in the next year, in 2011, during the East Asia Summit 
(EAS). In the occasion, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao defended the inadequacy of 
the forum for the discussion of the topic. Even so, he reaffirmed China´s posture of 
collaboration with ASEAN neighbors, which set, through the COC, the negotiation of 
a Code of Conduct. The premier reinforced the importance of mutual trust and 
cooperation to ensure the regional stability (“Premier...” 2011, 1). Wen made clear 
with such declaration that the attempt to press the country through the involvement of 
other parts in the negotiation, would not lead to a solution of disputes. 
In the same year, Chinese ma itime patrol ships aproached the vietnamese  
seismic survey ship, Binh Minh 02, during an operation supposedly inside the 
vietnamese EEZ and cut one of its cables of seismic monitoring. The episode had 
great repercussion in Vietnam, with public protests an i-China organized by the 
national elite in main cities of the country. The domestic pressure stimulated a 
mor  assertive answer from the Vietnames  Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, 
whose declaration reaffirmed the determination of the Party, the population and the 
army of protection of the Vietnam’s rights on the region (Thayer 2011, 86-88). 
In the following weeks several military exercises were carried out in 
Vietnamese waters, fostering the wave of nationalist demonstrations, which lasted 
around twelve weeks, mobilizing a great part of the Vietnamese society (Thayer 
2011, 89). To avoid the escalation of tensions, Vietnam and China leaders met and 
published through a joint announcement that ensure the mutual disposition in solving 
the question by peaceful negotiations, aimed at peacekeeping and regional stability. 
The announcement also mentioned public demonstrations about the topic and the 
need that they were guided by governments: the Comunist Parties should avoid that 
popular demonstrations prejudice the bilateral relation (Thayer 2011, 90). 
Therefore, Beijing decided that it needed to review its posture with regard to 
the SCS, expanding the legal backing of its sovereign rights. Thereby, it released in 
2011, the 12º Chinese Five-Year Plan for Oceanic Development, which reaffirmed the 
need to reinforce the legal structure related to Chinese demands in the SCS and 
defined measures to protect and preserve the existing maritime resources, including 
natural resources (Jian 2013, 23). In the next year, the country announced the creation 
of a new city, Sansha, under the jurisdiction of the Province of Hainan, whose 
objective would be the administration of the Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos (Jian 
Source: People’s Republic 
of China 2009 
Talita Pinotti
171
regard to the SCS, expanding the legal backing of its sovereign rights. There-
by, it released in 2011, the 12º Chinese Five-Year Plan for Oceanic Develop-
ment, which reaffirmed the need to reinforce the legal structure related to 
Chinese demands in the SCS and defined measures to protect and preserve 
the existing maritime resources, including natural resources (Jian 2013, 23). 
In the next year, the country announced the creation of a new city, Sansha, 
under the jurisdiction of the Province of Hainan, whose objective would be 
the administration of the Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos (Jian 2013, 23). 
The creation of the city had been already authorized in 2007, but Vietnamese 
protests suspended its establishment (Crisis Group 2012b, 23).
Still in 2012, and in great part as a response to Chinese practices, the 
Vietnam National Assembly published a Vietnamese law about the Law of 
the Sea. In general, the document presented devices which determine that in 
the case of a conflict between national and international norms of maritime 
rights, the second one should prevail over the first: the initiative represents 
the effort to adequate Vietnamese laws regarding the UNCLOS (Hai 2013, 
29).9
Besides the adequacy to the International Law, another strategy em-
ployed in the the SCS dispute, for countries like Vietnam, is the internation-
alization of the debate: this increases the geopolitical costs of a more asser-
tive action, or even coercive, by China in the resolution of maritime disputes. 
Between the countries that direct or indirectly end up involved on the SCS 
question the USA stands out, whose interests go beyond the questions related 
to trade and the exploration of natural resources.
The American involvement in the SCS question is also justified by 
the reorganization of the priorities of the American foreign policy. When 
Barack Obama came into Presidential power in 2009, he defined as one of 
hos goals the revival of the the aliance with Asia and the reassurance of Amer-
ican leadership in the region (Obama 2009). In 2010, in ARF, Hilary Clinton, 
then Secretary of State, classified the SCS question as an American “national 
interest” and listed the principles that guided USA posture: in the first place, 
the freedom of navigation, that can be translated in free access for American 
ships, in particular of the contingente of the Seventh Fleet, to the region, 
9  In the response letter to the Chinese verbal note, in 2009, Vietnam signals that its proposal 
were in accordance with the UNCLOS provisions, while the Chinese contestation based on the 
nine lines map had no legal foundation. Hai (2013) affirms that such change occurs due to a 
modification in the strategic perception: while the plea with historical bases would legitimize 
China’s own claim, the use of legal arguments for the territorial contestation, not only would 
suit to the existing international norm, but iit would also require the Chinese counterpart to 
review its own plea (Hai 2013, 28).
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taking into account the norms of international right. In the second place, the 
freedom of maritime trade routes that passes by the SCS and guarantee the 
access to important consumers and exporters at Southeast Asia. In the third 
place, the adequacy of maritime claims to the UNCLOS principles, that re-
quires a clarification of the Chinese plea based on the nine lines map10 (Bader, 
Lieberthal, McDevitt 2014, 6-7).
In the fourth place, the appreciation of the sovereignty-territory rela-
tion, which assigned legitimacy only to the claims based on the extension of 
the Continental Shelf inside the limit set by the UNCLOS, invalidating the 
Chinese map. Finally, the emphasis in the negotiated resolution of the dis-
pute, that intends to avoid the coercion and the expansion of the tensions that 
could harm American interests or, even, drag the USA to an unwanted con-
flict (Bader, Lieberthal, McDevitt 2014, 7). Such points reveals the ambiguity 
of the American position that, at the same time that is concerned in reaffirm-
ing its space in Asia, seems unwillingly to get involved in an extra-regional 
conflict, or, even, to compromisse its relation with China (Bader, Lieberthal, 
McDevitt 2014, 2-4).
For China, an increase in American presence can threaten the already 
unstable regional balance of forces, also undermining the efforts of decades 
of harmonization of its relations with the neighbors. For Vietnam, a greater 
American leadership represents greater security at the same time that it also 
may represent the choice between China and USA that must be avoided by all 
means for the guarantee of its own national interestes.
The SCS and the National Interests
Chinese national interest is based on a set of variables from differ-
ent origins. In foreign policy, the SCS question challenges at the same time 
the international and regional Chinese strategy. By signing and ratifying the 
UNCLOS as an effort of reinforce its image of a “responsible power”, the 
country restricted its possibility of completely denying the Convention. Since 
recognizing the strategic relevance of UNCLOS for Chinese foreign policy, 
the country has been developing a set of domestic legal instruments that suit 
to the Convention (Jian 2013, 20). Even a major Chinese “assertiveness” in 
the region may be interpreted in this sense: the international law tends to 
prioritize the effective and continuous occupation over the historical rights 
10  Such identification worries the USA, because the case referred to the sovereign rights over 
the existing resources in the region, it can prejudice American companies that exercise fishing 
activities or the exploration of the region’s resources.
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in the analysis of territorial disputes. Then, a greater Chinese activism with 
regard to the Spratlys and Paracels archipelagos and to the exploration of  nat-
ural resources, would have the intention to reinforce the Chinese presence 
as a “responsible power” for the areas in dispute (Jian 2013, 22). Allied to 
this would be the fact that, due to the Chinese economic growth, the country 
acquired capacity to effectively monitor its region. The percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) destined to defence is low, but it translates in large 
investments for the sake of the size of Chinese economy. The result is the 
modernization of the navy, the expansion of patrol capacity and, consequently, 
the multiplication of incidentes (Jian 2013, 21; Yahuda 2012, 32).
On regional policy, the SCS is, on the one hand, an opportunity for 
the Chinese government to prove to the neighbors that it’s capable of getting 
involved in a constructive way in the region, representing a source of support 
and alliance essential for Southeast Asia stability. On the other hand, when 
the overlap of demands contributes to the expansion of historical tensions 
and the internationalization of the topic, raises an extreme disapproval of Chi-
na, the country is faced by a deadlock since it needs to avoid a posture that 
would risk all the progress obtained with the good neighbor policy practiced 
since the 1990 (Yahuda 2012, 32-34).
Also in the regional spectrum, there is the nationalism that, in Chi-
na’s case, is confused with a high self-confidence, motivated by the socioeco-
nomic advancement of the last decades. China would be retaking the glorius 
path of the “Middle Empire”, leaving behind the period of subjugation to the 
West and Japan: so, it may retake rights that were denied until then (Yahuda 
2012, 34). It helps to explain, for example, the difficulty to accept the UN-
CLOS dispute resolution mechanisms for the SCS question: accept Western 
solutions for regional problems may be seen by the population as a weakness 
of the CCP (Crisis Group 2012a, 4-5).
The SCS also raises more practical interests: a greater integration of 
the Chinese economy to global and regional economies expanded the need 
to ensure the maintenance and stability of trade routes that passes by SCS. It 
is estimated, for example, that one third of the Chinese oil imports reach the 
country by the SCS that, as already pointed, connects the Pacific and Indian 
oceans, besides being the most direct connection with the Middle East (Yahu-
da 2012, 32). Before the increasing Chinese energy dependence, such trade 
route becomes strategic. Finally, the SCS represents a “natural shield” for 
the access to China’s territorry: the coastal region of Guangxi and Guandong 
is one of the richest, most populous and most developed of China, besides 
it connects essential regions for the Chinese national integration strategy: 
Hong Kong and Taiwan (Kaplan 2014, 41).
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The Vietnamese interest on the SCS is also motivated by several ele-
ments. In Vietnam’s case, the SCS exercises a particular role: of favoring the 
national unity. The separation history between North and South of the coun-
try, allied to a particular geographic distribution, makes Vietnam present a 
wide polarization between the two extremes of its territory. The concentration 
of demographic and economic activities in Hanoi (north) and Ho Chi Minh 
(South) creates a detachment between the areas that goes beyond the geo-
graphic issue. Therefore, the wide coast of 3.444 km is the link between the 
two most dynamic regions of Vietnam, it’s the element that keeps the national 
cohesion and unity (Hai 2013, 27).
Despite the its extensive coast, Vietnam has no historic of intense 
maritime explorations: the country has a limited naval capability that, com-
bined with the narrowing of the central part of the territory, strengthens the 
perception of its maritime vulnerability (Hai 2013, 27). To reduce its fragility, 
Vietnam has made efforts in the sense of modernizing its navy and expanding 
defense ties with ASEAN and foreign powers, as already mentioned in the 
USA’s case (Crisis Group 2012b, 4).
As well as China, the Vietnamese nationalist sentiment is an explan-
atory part of the subject. National identity is marked by the historic of re-
sistance against various foreign powers that had invaded the country: China, 
France, Japan and USA. In this scenario, nationalism is still influencing the 
political decisions of the country, especially those that involve former aggres-
sors, such as China. In the SCS case, for example, to give up of the claims in 
favor Chinese predominance, would represent an outrage to the Vietnamese 
identity of resistance and defence of territorial integrity, raising historical re-
sentments (Crisis Group 2012b, 4).
The distrust and animosity in relation to China end up being used by 
the Vietnamese Comunist Party as an excuse to avoid certain commitments 
or to press the neighbor. The protests that spread through Vietnam, in 2011, 
after the episode with the seismic monitoring ship, are a great example: the 
manifestation was supported by the governmet as long as it represented a 
pressure element over China, from the moment that both sides were willing 
to talk, the manifestation was suppressed (Crisis Group 2012b, 20). Moreover, 
proof of the instrumental use of the Vietnamese nationalism is the country’s 
approach with the USA, which also keeps a historic of aggression: even so, the 
memory of the war was left in the background in favor of the current strategy.
Moreover, the territorial disputes introduced an opportunity to ensure 
to the country its autonomy in relation to China. In the SCS, even if all coun-
tries present a different regional and international projection, they are equally 
a relevant part of the territorial dispute. When the smaller neighbors of South-
Talita Pinotti
175
east Asia, placed ASEAN as an intermediate in the negotiations, they gained 
weight in the disputes and in the Chinese strategic calculus. The inclusion 
of the topic on the ARF’s 2010 agenda is one of the main examples of such 
strategy (Crisis Group 2012a, 6).
The SCS stills gain prominence on the Vietnamese economic strat-
egy. Today´s Vietnam is a country focused on exports and, due to its already 
mentioned geographic characteristics, concentrated on maritime trade: thus, 
the guarentee of freedom of navigation and of the trade routes that passes by 
the SCS is essential (Hai 2013, 8). Besides, fishing activity is important for 
the exports as well as for Vietnam’s domestic market. Then, the peaceful res-
olution of disputes and the exploration of resources as in the Gulf of Tonkin’s 
case, are essential for the country (Crisis Group 2012b, 16).
 
Final Considerations
 This brief analysis revealed, therefore, that the SCS question involves 
a variety of conditions that characterize the complexity of the topic. The 
search for the sovereignty of the archipelagos without potential for habitation 
or economic exploration hides, actually, much more subjective and revealing 
components of the regional dynamics and challenges. These disputes are a 
reflection of the race for strategic positions, strongly influenced by regional 
nationalism.
We saw that even the internationalization of the debate about the SCS 
is far from representing the answer for the solution of disputes, it brings new 
nuances to the already complicated regional context. Combining historical 
questions, regional stability and the presence of foreign actors, the SCS ques-
tion challenges the very basis of Chinese regional actions.
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The dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea involves strategic 
interests that are mixed with cultural and historical heritages fundamental to the un-
derstanding of their respective positions. Ensure the sovereignty over the islands, for 
these countries, also means to ensure important economic and geopolitical interests 
in Asia.
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